Introduction
China's emergence as a global power raises concerns about its economic policies. Monetary policy commands attention, since maintaining low inflation is crucial for social and economic stability.
High inflation could erode the value of Chinese households' large savings in domestic banksbroad money M2 amounted to over 150% of GDP in 2008. And China's policymakers are also concerned about sustaining rapid economic growth. Hence considering a central bank loss function including inflation and output gaps, as in Svensson (1999) , is likely to further our understanding of the conduct of monetary policy in China. But China's institutional features, in particular the limited role of interest rates in the monetary transmission mechanism, precludes estimating benchmark monetary policy reaction functions popular for analyzing more advanced economies.
The paper models monetary policy in China using a hybrid McCallum-Taylor reaction function (McCallum, 2000; Sánchez-Fung, 2005) . The main question we seek to answer is: How does the People's Bank of China react to developments in the economy, in particular to output, inflation and exchange rate gaps? In tackling that question, the investigation estimates reaction functions to capture the monetary authorities' adjustments of the monetary base in reaction to the variables of policy interest. The econometric modeling also estimates a reaction function incorporating a survey-based measure of inflation expectations.
Discussions about China's monetary policy have largely focused on the exchange rate, especially in the context of the 2007-2009 crises where the country's dollar peg was thought to be important in feeding the global imbalances (Corden, 2009) . That is why China's decision of returning to a de facto dollar peg in the summer of 2008 generated criticism. In principle, the problem is that fixing the exchange rate renders domestic interest rate policy ineffective in the presence of full capital mobility. But China's capital controls have been largely binding, so that determining the link between movements in the exchange rate and domestic monetary policy is an empirical matter.
Previous studies use quantity-based rules in modeling China's monetary policy, but the ultimate aim was different from the present study. Burdekin and Siklos (2008) rules, but these are based on actual (instrumented) inflation outcomes rather than on surveys.
We find that monetary policy in China has been procyclical in terms of reactions to inflation. The finding matches the fact that accelerated reform policies have generally coincided with increases in bank lending and inflation pressures (Naughton, 2007) . But there is evidence of stabilizing policy via reactions to the output gap, and that may reflect the importance to the authorities of supporting economic growth and employment. Importantly, exchange rate shocks do not seem to significantly impact domestic monetary policy. The outcome probably reflects effective capital controls, which have allowed for conducting a largely independent monetary policy in China. There is no evidence of a structural break, in terms of the estimated monetary policy reaction function, following the end of the strict dollar peg in July 2005.
The paper also includes survey-based inflation expectations in the Chinese monetary policy reaction function. Using business surveys to evaluate the relevance of including forwardlooking elements in the estimated equations produces evidence of stabilizing policy in terms of inflation. But the finding is dependent on the measure of inflation expectations.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 specifies the empirical monetary policy reaction function, relating it to the specific features of China's monetary policy and institutions. Section 3 contains the econometric modeling of the benchmark reaction functions. Section 4 estimates an empirical monetary policy reaction function including a survey-based measure of inflation expectations. Section 5 concludes.
Specifying a McCallum-Taylor reaction function
The paper models monetary policy in China using the type of hybrid McCallum- Taylor In equation (1) is the output gap measured as the difference between actual and potential output; is the inflation gap, i.e. the difference between actual inflation and the pre-announced annual inflation target. The gap gives the nominal trade-weighted exchange rate's deviations from a long-run trend path.
The monetary base is the relevant instrument under the control of the policymaker (McCallum, 1988 The target variables on the right hand side of (1) are rationalized by the formal objectives of the People's Bank of China. The announced objective of Chinese monetary policy is to "maintain the stability of the value of the currency and thereby promote economic growth". 4 While the specification of a final target suggests that the value of the currency is important, promoting economic growth is in line with the Chinese government's concern for providing sufficient employment and maintaining social stability. This supports inclusion of the output gap in equation (1). As an expanding output gap may result in inflationary pressures, its inclusion is justified also on the basis of maintaining price stability.
In estimating the output gap in China the analysis applies a Hodrick-Prescott filter to yearon-year growth rates of industrial production, with a conventional smoothing parameter of 1,600.
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Holz (2004) notes that China's data collection is most advanced for the industrial sector. Industry covered 47% of China's GDP both at the start (1994) and end (2008) of our estimation sample.
There is also a strand of research related to the limitations and reliability of Chinese GDP statistics (Rawski, 2001; Holz, 2008) . Recent important revisions to GDP data -in particular the 17% upward adjustment to its level in late 2005-have been due to corrections regarding the size of the service sector.
China does not operate a formal inflation targeting regime, but annual targets for CPI growth are set by the Central Economic Working Conference. We employ that measure in constructing the inflation gap. 6 For 1994-1997, targets were only defined for retail price inflation (RPI), a variable that is closely correlated with CPI inflation. For those years, CPI inflation targets are constructed using the announced RPI inflation target and adding the gap between actual CPI and RPI inflation for the previous year. The final gap in equation (1) is the exchange rate gap. China has tightly controlled the value of the yuan against the dollar, even after the strict dollar peg was disbanded in July 2005. The fixed exchange rate arrangement makes China different from some other transition economies (see e.g.
Granville and Mallick, 2010, for evidence on the role of the exchange rate in Russian monetary policy). The existence of the strict peg during most of the sample ruled out use of the bilateral rate in the econometric modeling. The model produces the impacts of the trade-weighted nominal exchange rate, which is not an operating target, on China's monetary policy. The rate is important from a policy perspective, as it captures imported inflation pressures and changes in competitiveness more extensively than a bilateral exchange rate. The exchange rate gap is defined as the deviation of a trade-weighted exchange rate from its trend. This measure abstracts from the trend appreciation affecting an emerging economy with rapid productivity growth and the ensuing BalassaSamuelson effect.
Estimating the monetary policy reaction function
The research plan involves estimating a hybrid McCallum-Taylor policy rule using vector autoregressions (VARs). The strategy allows starting from a single equation specification by focusing on part of the estimated system and subsequently examining richer dynamics via an impulse response analysis. The starting point is a benchmark reduced-form vector autoregression:
.
In (2), the x t is a (K×1) vector of endogenous variables, the A p are fixed (K×K) coefficient matrices, and u t is assumed to follow a K-dimensional white noise process with E(u t ) = 0. A four- The time series data are for 1994Q1 to 2008Q4, but estimations begin at 1994Q2, due to the use of first-differenced data for monetary base. Year 1994 is an important year in terms of reforms, as the former dual exchange rate system gave way to a single exchange rate framework, the fiscal system underwent a revamping, and policy banks were created to differentiate policy-related financing from commercially-oriented activities.
The VARs include three lags, to allow for one full year of dynamics in the level of the monetary base, and estimate the system using ordinary least squares. The system includes a constant and a linear trend. The modeling process reduces the estimated VARs to a parsimonious system by sequentially eliminating all coefficients with t-values below the threshold of 1.00, at each step reestimating the system and deleting the coefficient with the lowest t-value. The resulting system, es-timated with feasible generalized least squares, passes the major misspecification tests for autocorrelation and ARCH effects. The estimated equation for the monetary base suggests that the People's Bank conducts a countercyclical policy, leaning against the wind, in terms of the output gap: an increase in the output gap leads to slower growth of the monetary base. 10 But the result for the inflation gap is the opposite: inflation above the government's target leads to an increase in the rate of change in monetary base, suggesting that policy is accommodating increases in inflation. 11 The latter finding is parallel to the argument by Naughton (2007) that demand for real resources has been accommodated by credit policy, which has then led to inflation. But as the inflation gap has been mostly negative during most of our sample period, inflation has not posed a problem for policy makers in China.
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The reaction of monetary base growth to the exchange rate gap is accommodative: exchange rate appreciation leads to a fall in base money growth. 14 However, the correlation matrix provides evidence against choosing forecast error impulse responses: the residuals appear contemporaneously correlated, and the correlations in many cases exceed , where T is the sample length. Under such conditions, shocks to the system would not happen in isolation. So the analysis opts for structural impulse responses with contemporaneous restrictions, in particular the AB model by Amisano and Giannini (1997) . Denoting the structural form errors as ε t and the reduced form disturbances as u t as before, the model is written as 14 The results can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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where * denotes an unrestricted element.
The structural shocks are an output shock , a price shock , a monetary policy shock -defined as a shock to monetary base -and an exchange rate shock . The structure of system (5) implies that the effective exchange rate gap, being determined largely outside of China, is allowed to react immediately to any shock hitting the system. The assumption is reasonable as we are not using the bilateral USD-yuan rate that was stable during a major part of the estimation sample. The monetary policy reaction function -corresponding to the second row in (5)-is constructed taking account of the policy maker's information set. While information about the exchange rate is available immediately, data on output and inflation gaps are only available with a lag.
The output gap appears in the third row and is specified to react slowly to shocks hitting the system, possibly due to pre-determined consumption and investment expenditure, as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) . But the output gap reacts rapidly to exchange rate shocks, to avoid over-identifying the system. 15 The inflation gap reacts slowly to shocks in output or the exchange rate. A slow response is in line with a standard Calvo-pricing scheme where prices are changed at exogenously determined random intervals (Calvo, 1983) , or due to menu costs. There is a policy dimension to the inflation gap variable since it incorporates the government's inflation target. So the inflation gap is allowed to react contemporaneously to a monetary policy shock. As there are K=4 endogenous variables, and K(K-1)/2 restrictions are necessary for exact identification, the sys-
The structural model is estimated using the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced form VAR, with a maximum likelihood estimator and scoring algorithm. It is of interest to consider the robustness of the responses in Figure 2 to changes in the structure of the estimated SVAR model. In particular, we investigate the responses to shocks in a system with a Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix and the following two orderings of the variables: {(y-y*), (π-π*), Δb, (e-e*)} and {(e-e*), Δb, (π-π*), (y-y*)}. The procyclical response to the inflation gap detected in the benchmark system remains when adopting the alternative models. With the first ordering, the response of policy to an output shock appears to be procyclical and with both orderings there is evidence of a procyclical policy response to the exchange rate. However, there is little theoretical support for the second ordering of variables.
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The exercise also considers a five-variable VAR including the benchmark one-year lending rate: in this system movements in the monetary aggregate should be negatively correlated with interest rates. In the reduced form equations, base money never enters the equation for interest rates with a statistically significant coefficient. The interest rate enters the equation for base money with a counterintuitive positive coefficient. It is difficult to identify shocks in the SVAR methodology including both base money and interest rates, as it is not clear how to simultaneously identify the (assumed) policy shocks. However, simple forecast error impulse responses indicate that there is no statistically significant impact of a base money shock on the interest rate. This result is expected given the limited role of interest rates in the monetary transmission mechanism, especially in the earlier part of our sample. 16 This finding is confirmed by examining the accumulated impact of exchange rate shocks on monetary base in levels instead of growth rates -there is no statistically significant impact on the level of base money. In contrast, structural shocks to output and prices have a statistically significant impact on base money in levels for several quarters. 17 The dynamics of the structural shocks do not need to seem identical to the coefficient estimates of the reduced form equations, as the structural shocks are identified by theoretical assumptions about the contemporaneous relationships between the reduced form errors. This explains why the policy reaction to the exchange rate gap is countercyclical in Eq. (2) but the response of base money to a structural shock in the exchange rate is largely insignificant in Figure 2 .
We have also estimated the VAR with a different measure of the output gap. Instead of using data on industrial production, we have computed an output gap based on the growth rates of real GDP, with an identical methodology to the one described in Section 2. The SVAR impulse responses are similar to those obtained with the benchmark model: a price shock is met with a procyclical policy response and the response to an output shock is countercyclical although statistically
insignificant. An exchange rate shock is also met with a procyclical policy response when real GDP is used. We emphasize that the findings should be treated with caution, taking into account the arguments in favour of the industrial production data in Section 2. The robustness tests provide evidence of the procyclical tendencies of China's monetary policy. Detailed results from all robustness tests are available from the authors upon request.
During the sample period there was a major change in China's exchange rate policy: on Formally, an h-step-ahead forecast is obtained as
, (6) where for j ≤ 0 and the 's (i= 1, …, p) are estimated parameters. 
Monetary policy reactions and survey-based inflation expectations
The previous analysis considers monetary policy reactions to current and past developments in the relevant variables, but does not explicitly include forward-looking terms. Given the empirically well-established lag between a change in the monetary policy stance -or a policy shock -and output and inflation, including a forward-looking variable in a policy reaction function can be easily (an increase or a decrease in sales prices). As the index values range from -100 to +100, the survey does not produce an actual point forecast for the price level or inflation, but it does capture the perceived and expected dynamics of sales prices. Figure 4 shows the inflation gap and the survey for price level of sales, with both series normalized by their standard deviations.
19 Woodford (2000) discusses problems related to excessive forward-looking reactions in monetary policy. 20 The People's Bank's survey on inflation expectations is highly correlated with the business survey used in our study for [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] where both series are available (contemporaneous correlation coefficient of 0.83). 21 A possible alternative would be to use actual future outcomes for inflation and estimate a forward-looking reaction by GMM, as reported in Zhang (2009) . However, our approach relies on surveys on inflation rather than a perfect foresight assumption. Given the difficulty of simultaneously identifying shocks both in terms of actual inflation and the survey-based measure in a SVAR framework, the modeling focuses on examining a reduced form equation similar to (3), but incorporating the first differences of the price level survey (π e In equation (7), while the long-run coefficient on the inflation gap is still positive, the one based on survey data carries a negative sign, suggesting that the People's Bank reacts to increases in inflation expectations via restrictive monetary policy. But in equation (7) the output gap carries a positive long-run coefficient, which provides some evidence that the countercyclical output gap response identified earlier in the paper actually captures a reaction to inflation expectations.
The analysis considers an alternative measure of inflation expectations computed using an autoregressive univariate model of inflation. An AR(1) model, including a constant term, is estimated as a rolling regression from 1994Q1-1998Q1 to 1994Q1-2008Q4, and at every observation a 4-quarter-ahead out-of-sample forecast is produced. This AR-based measure of inflation expectations does not appear to be statistically significant for the resulting sample of 1998Q1-2008Q4.
Conclusion
The paper models monetary policy in China using a hybrid McCallum-Taylor reaction function.
The estimated reaction function allows feedback from developments in the output and inflation gaps, together with the effective trade-weighted exchange rate, using base money as the instrument.
The analysis finds that Chinese monetary policy has been procyclical, reflecting an accommodative reaction to developments in the inflation gap. This is in line with the empirical observation that liberalization policies in terms of reforms and regulation have coincided with increases in lending and inflation. But the reaction to the output gap has been countercyclical, whereas the money supply has not reacted significantly to developments in the exchange rate.
The paper finds stabilizing policy behavior when using business surveys of price developments, suggesting that the People's Bank of China reacts significantly to inflation expectations. The finding is consistent with the estimation of policy reaction functions in a general equilibrium framework, such as Zhang (2009) , or in a three-equation New-Keynesian model, as in Liu and Zhang (2007) . Similarly, the countercyclical response for the output gap probably reflects reactions to future price developments. 
